What Investors Should Know Before Buying Finlete Athlete Shares: A Scouting-Driven ROI Analysis

Over the past few weeks, a company called Finlete has spread rapidly across baseball and sports social media. The idea of ordinary fans investing directly into the future of athletes was interesting to a lot of fans including me. The premise is simple on the surface: each prospect has a share price, and fans can invest giving the prospects money immediately while the investors get a percentage of the prospect's future earnings. Beneath the viral buzz though is a more complex question: Does this model actually make financial sense for investors? I was really interested to understand whether this new form of athlete investment is an actual viable option or just a novel idea with little long-term upside. To do that, I built a data driven ROI model for all eight Finlete prospects who are currently open to investors. Using SEC Form C filings, historical MLB earnings data, player development research, and scouting outcome tiers, I evaluated each athlete’s likelihood of returning a positive investment and where their true financial value lies. What I found answered my original question and revealed much more about the structure and long-term implications of athlete investing. 

Before diving into the modeling, it’s essential to understand what Finlete is actually offering. The company gives minor leaguer players early financial support in exchange for 1% of their future earnings. These future earnings include all pre-arbitration salaries, arbitration raises, Major league contracts, and even overseas professional contracts. Their current Minor league salaries do not count. However, the full 1% does not go straight to investors. Each SEC Form C filing specifies what percentage of that 1% investors actually receive. Most players allocate 45% of their 1% to investors while the two starting pitchers Avila and Santos allocate 67.5%. To illustrate the scale, if a starting pitcher had a career like Clayton Kershaw, who earned $298.68M, the 1% Finlete cut would be $2,986,800 by the end of his career last year. Under the 67.5% investor allocation, investors collectively would only receive $2,016,090 divided by the total number of shares they owned. This scale is drastically different from the get rich quick assumptions most fans were talking about online. There are scenarios where investors profit, but they require a player to outperform their expectations or reach a meaningful MLB career length. 

To evaluate whether any of these athletes could realistically produce positive returns, I built a structured ROI model grounded in my own scouting analysis and research. First, I wanted to create three tiers for each player based on my expected career earnings. The low outcome means they busted or had minimal MLB earnings. The mid outcome was my expected career based on their tools and MLB comps. The high outcome was the realistic upside outcome based on what I thought would be their maximum developmental success. These salary expectations were based on their positional value, tools, historical outcomes for similar players, and organizational development track records. I then needed to assign probabilities to each tier that was based on what I believed the player was more likely to achieve. Then I translated my projected earnings into actual investor payouts by multiplying each payout by the 1% Finlete rate and by the investor allocation percentage. Finally, I divided the projected investor payout by total shares and compared that value to an input value which would reveal an expected ROI and break-even thresholds. 

Expected ROI model for all 8 Finlete athletes

Luinder Avila is one of two Finlete athletes who debuted during the 2025 season, and he made an immediate impression. In only 14 innings he posted a 1.29 ERA with a 28.6% strikeout rate and 50% groundball rate while flashing a legit four pitch mix. Unlike other pitchers on this list, Avila does not rely heavily on velocity or even a single overpowering pitch. His curveball is his most used and effective offering. It generates strong chase rates and solid whiff numbers. His four seamer plays the best against left handers due to its natural cut while his sinker is mostly used to jam righties and create weak contact. Even though his changeup has been inconsistent, it was developing in a positive direction last season and now has the potential to be a usable fourth pitch. Avila’s biggest limitations are command and his below average fastball quality. These give him a relatively capped ceiling but a stable floor. He projects as either a bottom of the rotation starter or a multiple innings reliever who can move between roles depending on what the team needs. Avila’s three outcome probabilities reflect both his relatively stable foundation of already being on a 40-man roster and his limitations. His extensive pitch mix gives him an above average chance of sustaining a big-league role. However, his command and lack of an above average fastball suppress his upside compared to other premium starter prospects. In the Low scenario (20%) he projects as a depth arm whose command struggles never resolve, basically what he currently is. I project him to earn anywhere between $2.5M and $4M if Avila is bouncing between Triple-A and MLB over the next few years. In the Mid scenario (55%) he resembles a swingman who is mostly in the bullpen or back of the rotation and accumulates between $8M and $15M throughout their careers. These pitchers survive in the big leagues but are there mainly to eat innings. Some pitchers in this space go on to have long careers and outperform their expected career salaries like Trevor Williams of the Nationals or Brent Suter of the Angels who have had 10-year careers in this role. My High scenario (25%) presumes that Avila’s command improves and his secondary grows which would place him in the range of a mid to low rotation starter where he would meet pitchers like Trevor Williams or Charlie Morton who have made over $30M in their careers. Say I invested $1000 in Avila’s career right now; he’d need to make $12,555,555 in his career for me to breakeven and make my $1000 back. I’d need him to basically get to my Mid outcome. Based on my model taking all of this into account, my expected ROI on Avila is -11.59%, which is the second highest out of the 8 prospects. 

Emiliano Teodo is one of the most electric arms in the Finlete portfolio and is easily the highest variance pitcher in the group. Armed with a fastball that routinely touches 100 mph and a slider that grades out as a legitimate pitch, Teodo's raw stuff is among the best in the Ranger’s system. His fastball generates elite carry and some late life which makes it a legit whiff generator at the top of the zone while his slider tunnels well enough to project it as a true chase pitch at the MLB level. However, Teodo’s developmental history has been defined as much by volatility as upside. His command remains well below average, and his walk rates consistently are above 12%. He also missed time last season due to shoulder issues and put up the worst numbers of his career. When everything clicks, Teodo looks like a future back of the bullpen weapon, but when the command wavers, he looks like he shouldn’t be on the field. His combination of elite stuff and significant risk gives him one of the widest outcome distributions of any Finlete athlete. Teodo’s three outcome probabilities reflect that volatility. The Low scenario (40%) represents the very real possibility that his command and health never stabilize, which prevents him from reaching or sticking in the Majors. Hard-throwing relievers with significant control problems frequently fail to accumulate service time, and Teodo’s floor resembles them, limiting his low expected career earnings to around $2M. The Mid outcome (40%) envisions Teodo of carving out a multi-year career as a middle reliever for multiple teams accumulating around $8M in MLB earnings. This means Teodo sticks around as a high upside reliever for a few years of jumping teams but never truly finds his place or control. The High outcome (20%) reflects Teodo hitting his ceiling and emerging as a high leverage reliever or closer. This would reflect a reliever like former Rangers and current Athletic Jose Leclerc. The distribution captures what makes Teodo a fascinating but risky investment. If I was to invest $1000 into Teodo he’d need to earn $20,333,333 for me to breakeven. This is why I’d suggest not investing in him as Teodo would need to be in bullpens for years and my expected ROI for him is -56.97%. 

Winston Santos has one of the more stable and long-term profiles among Finlete’s pitching group in my opinion. He blends an above average strike throwing ability with a fastball that has steadily climbed into the mid-90s. Unlike Teodo’s volatility or Avila’s finesse driven approach, Santos is more conventional in his pitch usage and developmental arc. His four-seam fastball shows carry at the top of the zone and has become a reliable foundation pitch. It’s supported by a slider that only has average movement but has produced great results and a changeup that is currently a work in progress. Santos’ most defining trait is his ability to limit walks, an attribute that dramatically increases the probability that he pitches in meaningful innings. While his secondary pitches have not shown the same bat missing qualities as some of the other arms in this group, his willingness to attack hitters and ability to eat innings project similar to a lot of pitchers who break into MLB rotations. The ceiling isn't flashy, but the floor is meaningfully higher than that of the other pitchers in this group. Santos’ outcome probabilities reflect the blend of safety and modest upside. His Low scenario (25%) accounts for the possibility that his secondary pitches never fully develop enough to turn over MLB lineups which could relegate him to a depth arm or low leverage reliever. Santos is already fighting for these depth innings this Spring against pitchers like Cal Quantrill, Austin Gomber, Kumar Rocker, Jacob Latz, and Carter Baumler. Two of these six pitchers, including Santos, will be on the Rangers roster. If Santos struggles to make the roster this season and, in the future, he’ll likely hit the low end of the scenario and make around $4M in his career. The Mid outcome (55%) envisions Santos establishing himself as a back-end starter who reliably eats innings across multiple seasons. This pathway could give Santos around $25M in career earnings surviving on multiple rotations as a consistent pitcher. The High scenario (20%) projects Santos making a meaningful jump in his secondary pitch quality allowing him to settle into a consistent No. 3-4 starter role earning around $45M similar to pitchers like Jordan Lyles or Adrian Houser. This distribution captures exactly why Santos offers the most balanced investment profiles among Finlete athletes. His floor is higher than every player while his ceiling might not be the highest; he seems to be on the path of carving out a great career. Using my model, if I was to invest $1000 into Santos, he’d need to make only $15,111,111 in his career for me to break even the lowest on this list due to his high investor pool percentage of 67.5%. This along with his high floor gives Santos the highest expected ROI in the model and the only positive one at 50.22%. 

Reynaldo Yean is another very volatile pitcher in the Finlete lineup, and his profile reflects a textbook example of a pure high risk pitching prospect. Yean’s raw stuff is undeniably electric. He routinely sits in the upper 90s with his fastball and pairs it with a power slider capable of generating a high whiff rate. When he lands pitches in the zone, he looks like a future All Star closer with the type of velocity and movement few relievers possess. However, Yean’s developmental challenge is glaring and has been difficult to overcome. His command is among the worst of any pitcher in the Minor Leagues. His walk rates are routinely above 15%, and his 2025 rate in High-A was up above 25%. While the Dodgers are one of the best organizations in baseball at developing power arms, even an elite development could not guarantee meaningful gains for Yean. His path is clear. If he can throw strikes at even a somewhat decent level, he’ll be a Major League reliever, but if he doesn’t, his profile collapses quickly. This makes him one of the widest range and lowest probability pitching investments available. Yean’s outcome probabilities reflect the extreme historical attrition rate for relievers with these severe command issues. The Low scenario (55%) represents the most likely outcome that Yeans never finds his control resulting in no MLB innings and earning $0 from MLB contracts. This is the common trajectory for an arm like Yean, pitchers who possessed big stuff but could never command it consistently enough to play at the highest level. The Mid outcome (35%) envisions Yean making enough gains in strike throwing to carve out a role as usable reliever depth and sticking on 40-man rosters for a few years such as players like former Dodger Yohan Ramirez who struggles with throwing strikes but has made more than 15 MLB appearances in every season the last six seasons. Yean would likely earn around $4M in career earnings if this outcome comes true. The High (10%) outcome envisions the Dodgers working their developmental magic and helping Yean harness his command enough to become a legitimate high leverage reliever earning like Teodo around $35M. While this scenario is the least likely, it is realistic given Yean’s raw tools. Overall, Yean’s distribution makes him the most unstable investment. His upside is real, but his floor is losing the entire investment. If I was to invest $1000, Yean would need to make $24,333,333 in career earnings for me to breakeven due to his share price and investor percentage. This means if Yean does not become a multi-year above average reliever, I would not breakeven on my investment. This gives Yean a -71.23% expected ROI. 

Luis Baez is one of the most intriguing position player investments in the Finlete portfolio. Built around a rare combination of raw power and offensive upside, Baez possesses some of the loudest exit velocities in the Astro’s system. He regularly produces triple digit contact and shows the type of natural power that can carry a corner outfield profile to the highest level. His swing is built for impactful damage and shows the potential of a future middle of the order bat. However, Baez’s offensive game also shows significant swing and miss tendencies, and his overall hit tool remains well below average. He strikes out at a high rate of 26.8% in 2025, and whiffs at a very high rate. His pitch selection fluctuates, and he tends to expand the zone which poses a real developmental hurdle against higher level pitching. Defensively, Baez projects primarily as a corner outfielder or first baseman. This places enormous pressure on his bat to carry his value going forward. This creates a classic high variance hitting profile with a clear pathway to the Majors but an equally clear avenue to stalling out in the Minors. Baez’s outcome probabilities reflect that blend of tantalizing upside and meaningful risk. The Low scenario (35%) assumes the hit tool never improves enough for his power to play at higher levels. This mirrors a common outcome for power first prospects, once they get promoted to Double-A or Triple-A. These players fail to produce like they did in lower levels, causing them to stall out like Baez did last year in Double-A putting up an 85 wRC+. This results in these players not making the Majors, and it would earn investors $0. The Mid scenario (45%) represents the most likely outcome and assumes Baez makes enough progress with pitch selection and zone control to become a functional MLB bench part or depth piece. This archetype would likely mean Baez earns between $3M and $8M in his career a lot like former Dodger Edwin Rios who struggles with swing and miss and has jumped between MLB and Triple-A a few times the last couple of years. This acknowledges that even imperfect bats often receive some Major League opportunities due to their power upside. The High scenario (20%) reflects Baez reaching his developmental ceiling becoming a true everyday corner outfielder with plus raw power and slightly below average contact. This outcome could generate around $30M in career earnings. Consistent players like Hunter Renfroe represent this outcome who carried a similar power centric profile with defensive limitations, but he accumulated multi-year contracts thanks to his home run productions. This outcome would require real progression in Baez’s approach the next couple of years, but their physical talent is undeniably there. Based on the model, if I invested $1000 into Baez, I’d need him to earn $16,222,222 in his career to breakeven. Based on his risky profile, my model has his expected ROI at -52.23%. 

Tirso Ornelas is a polarizing hitting prospect, and his evaluations hinges heavily on separating real offensive skill from environmental noise. Ornelas has long been regarded as a polished bat with strong strike zone control, above average contact skills, and a mature approach. His production in Triple-A in the last four seasons looks impressive on the surface but like many hitters in the Pacific Coast League, his numbers were inflated by a hitter friendly environment that exaggerates batting averages and power output. Underlying batted ball data shows modest exit velocities and a swing more geared toward line drives than true home run power. This limits his long-term upside as a corner outfielder. Defensively, Ornelas is passable but nowhere near elite. He offers value primarily through his bat to ball profile and on base skills rather than impactful athletic tools. The argument for Ornelas centers around his past performance, contact quality, plate discipline, and the fact that he made the Majors last season playing in seven games. The risks involve whether his offense carries enough thump to justify an everyday role and whether his PCL production can translate once exposed to Major League pitching quality. As the league saw last season, that wasn’t the case as Ornelas hit .071 in his 16 plate appearances. Ornelas’ three outcome probabilities reflect the reality that contact first Triple-A bats have historically produced a wide range of career outcomes, but very few actually provide everyday value unless paired with some power or defensive ability. The Low scenario (40%) assumes Ornelas’s bat lacks sufficient impact for the Majors. This makes him a constant DFA candidate and only earning around $2.5M in his career. This is a common fate for PCL inflated performers like former Padre Brett Sullivan. The Mid scenario (50%) projects Ornelas as a bench outfielder at best in a platoon role with some solid contact skills and at least modest power. Players in this archetype typically earn around $6M across their careers. Players such as former Phillie Jake Cave or current Ray Jake Fraley fit this mold as contact-oriented outfielders who provide a platoon role in the outfield. The High scenario (10%) reflects the possibility that Ornelas adds a small jump in game power and becomes a steady everyday outfielder in the Majors. This path could net Ornelas around $30-35M in career earnings and includes players like Alex Verdugo and Robbie Grossman. Outfielders who leverage strong contact ability and plate discipline to secure regular roles. While this outcome is least likely, Ornelas does have the foundation to keep the door cracked. Based on his more likely projections, it makes Ornelas the highest expected ROI for any Finlete hitter. If I was to invest $1000 in him, he’d need to earn $19M in career earnings. This gives Ornelas an expected ROI of -44.34% in my model.  

Aroon Escobar is one of the more bat driven profiles on this list. He offers offensive promise but notable defensive concerns. Escobar shows emerging power for his age, strong bat speed, and a patient approach that allows him to control the strike zone more effectively than most young hitters. His offensive game is built around high quality contact and a growing strength projection. This gives him a chance to develop into an above average hitter as he physically matures. The questions for Escobar other than how he’ll grow all start with his defense. Escobar lacks refined footwork and range at shortstop, and while he may eventually settle at second or third, he’ll need to hit at an above average rate to profile as an everyday player. Because of this, his evaluation hinges heavily on how much impact his bat ultimately produces. If the offense and his body develop the defensive limitations can be masked but if it doesn't, the profile becomes much more difficult to carry on a roster. This creates a balanced but uncertain projection, especially with Escobar only being 21 years old and being in the states for two seasons. His outcome probabilities reflect that combination of offensive promise with potential defensive liability. The Low scenario (45%) assumes the bat does not progress enough to justify a Major League role given his defensive shortcomings. This would result in Escobar never being put on a 40-man roster and earning $0. In 2025 he played his first games in Low-A, High-A, and Double-A, so Escobar still has awhile to develop and mature before being a Major League player. The Mid outcome (40%) projects Escobar as a utility infielder capable of moving around to second, third, short, or even the corner outfield. He’s supported by competitive at bats and enough offensive production to stick on a roster and potentially in a starting lineup. He could earn around $10M in this role carving out a long career. Players like Jace Peterson and Donovan Solano fit this role. The High scenario (15%) imagines Escobar’s power and offensive consistency continuing to develop as he fills out allowing him to become an everyday infielder. In this outcome, Escobar’s career earnings are around $40M just like Jonathan Schoop and Eduardo Escobar. The defensive limitations are heavy and with Aroon Escobar’s share price being tied for the highest out of all Finlete athletes it means a lower return for investors. If I was to invest $1000 into Escobar, he would need to earn $30.5M for me to breakeven. This basically means he has to become a starter for a long time for me to earn my money back. This is why even though Escobar might be the best and my favorite position player in the group, he isn’t worth investing in, and his expected ROI is only -63.93%. 

Yario Padilla is the youngest player on the Finlete roster and is very projection dependent. His evaluation reflects both significant developmental runway and substantial uncertainty. At just 18 years old Padilla shows mature contact skills for his age, a sound swing, and the ability to make consistent line drive contact. His rhythm is more advanced than most of his peers, and his bat to ball foundation gives him a baseline offensive skill. However, his physical projection remains one of the key variables in this evaluations. Padilla has not yet grown into an impact frame, and it is still unclear whether he’ll ever develop the strength required to hit for meaningful power. Currently in only 73 games combined in the DSL and Complex League, he’s only hit one homerun. His defensive home is still fluid; he currently is playing shortstop but could jump to third or second depending on how he grows. If he does not grow into average pop, his contact first offensive profile must carry the load. These competing developmental forces make Padilla one of the widest range position players you can invest in. Padilla’s outcome probabilities reflect the combination of youth drive volatility and uncertain projection. The Low scenario (55%) assumes that Padilla’s body does not meaningfully fill out, and his offensive game remains contact-oriented but not impactful. In this outcome, pitchers at higher levels challenge him with tougher pitchers, and it limits his production. This outcome means Padilla never makes the Majors, which for most 18-year-old prospects is the likely outcome. The Mid scenario (35%) reflects a more optimistic developmental path where Padilla’s contact ability remains throughout the Minors and carries him to the Majors. He becomes versatile playing multiple positions and earns around $6M to $10M just like Escobar before. The High outcome (10%) represents the scenario that Padilla reaches his full potential adding meaningful strength and evolves into an everyday infielder. This version of Padilla as described by multiple outlets turns him into basically current Diamondback and All Star Ketel Marte. The switch-hitting profile and needs to grow into his body mirror what Marte went through, and Padilla profiles a lot like him. Marte has earned $60M so far throughout his career but is in the middle of a $116.5M deal until his 38-year-old season. To keep it more realistic, I’ll keep the Padilla evaluation at $60M. Based on the high risk of investing in an 18-year-old with only 38 games in the states, Padilla is still very low on my model. If I invested $1000 into Padilla, he’d need to earn $18M in career earnings for me to break even. This makes his expected ROI -56.67%. 

After evaluating all eight investable Finlete athletes through detailed scouting reports, outcome modeling, probability weighting, and ROI calculations, the answer to the core question becomes clear. Finlete is in a far more advantageous position for themselves and the players than it is for the investors. While the structure does provide meaningful early financial support to minor league prospects, the expected financial return for investors is overwhelmingly negative in almost every realistic scenario. Only one player in the model, Winston Santos, produced a positive expected ROI and even that required a highly specific developmental path paired with a more favorable investor allocation percentage than most athletes. For the rest of the group, the investors would need the athlete to dramatically outperform my typical career outcomes simply to break even let alone make a profit. The combination of small investor revenue shares, the low overall percentage of career earnings allocated to shareholders, and the inherently risky nature of projecting Minor League performance makes positive returns incredibly unlikely. In the end, investing in Finlete athletes is best understood not as a financial strategy, but as a form of patronage or support for young players chasing a dream. The model shows that while the concept is unique and beneficial for prospects who need stability, it is not a genuinely viable investment vehicle for those seeking consistent or meaningful financial returns. However, Finlete could significantly improve investor viability with several structural changes. First, the most impactful adjustment would be increasing the percentage of future earnings allocated to investors. The current 45%-67.5% of the 1% pool results in investors receiving less than half a percent of a player’s career earnings. Raising investor participation to 70%-85% of the 1% pool or increasing the base percentage of 1% would dramatically improve the breakeven thresholds. Second, Finlete could adopt a tiered share structure where early investors receive a larger percentage of the payout aligning with early risk. Currently there’s no reason to invest in an 18-year-old when some players are already on MLB contracts. With these few adjustments, Finlete could evolve from a novelty platform into a legitimate alternative investment market within sports.